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Recent results have shown that algorithms for learning the optimal commitment in
a Stackelberg game are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. These learning al-
gorithms operate by querying the best responses of the follower, who consequently can
deceive the algorithm by using fake best responses, typically by responding according to
fake payoffs that are different from the actual ones. For this strategic behavior to be suc-
cessful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the fake payoffs that would
make the learning algorithm output a commitment that benefits them the most. While
this problem has been considered before, the related literature has only focused on a sim-
ple setting where the follower can only choose from a finite set of payoff matrices, thus
leaving the general version of the problem unanswered. In this paper, we fill this gap by
showing that it is always possible for the follower to efficiently compute (near-)optimal fake
payoffs, for various scenarios of learning interaction between the leader and the follower.
Our results also establish an interesting connection between the follower’s deception and
the leader’s maximin utility: through deception, the follower can induce almost any (fake)
Stackelberg equilibrium if and only if the leader obtains at least their maximin utility in
this equilibrium.
1. Introduction
Stackelberg games are a simple yet powerful model for sequential interaction among strategic
agents. In such games there are two players: a leader and a follower. The leader commits
c©2021 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
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to a strategy, and the follower acts upon observing the leader’s commitment. The sim-
ple sequential structure of the game permits modeling a multitude of important scenarios.
Indicative applications include the competition between a large and a small firm (von Stack-
elberg, 2010), the allocation of defensive resources, i.e., Stackelberg security games (Tambe,
2011; Korzhyk et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2013; Delle Fave et al., 2014; Gan et al., 2015),
the competition among mining pools in the Bitcoin network (Marmolejo-Cosśıo et al., 2019;
Sun et al., 2020), and the protection against manipulation in elections (Elkind et al., 2021;
Yin et al., 2018).
In Stackelberg games, the leader is interested in finding the best commitment she can
make, assuming that the follower behaves rationally. The combination of such a commit-
ment by the leader and the follower’s rational best response to it leads to a strong Stack-
elberg equilibrium (SSE). In general, the utility that the leader obtains in an SSE is larger
than what she would obtain in a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding simultaneous-move
game (von Stengel & Zamir, 2004). Hence, the leader prefers to commit than to engage in
a simultaneous game with the follower.
In case the leader has access to both her and the follower’s payoff parameters (or,
payoffs, for short), computing an SSE is a computationally tractable problem (Conitzer
& Sandholm, 2006). In practice however, the leader may have limited or no information
about the follower’s payoffs. In order to determine the optimal commitment, the leader
must endeavor to elicit information about the incentives of the follower through indirect
means. This avenue of research has led to a plethora of active-learning-based approaches
for the computation of SSEs (Balcan et al., 2015; Blum et al., 2014; Letchford et al., 2009;
Peng et al., 2019; Roth et al., 2016). Meanwhile, inspired by recent developments in the
ML community regarding adversarial examples in classification algorithms (Lowd & Meek,
2005; Barreno et al., 2010), there has been a stream of recent papers exploring the notion
of adversarial deception in Stackelberg games, whereby the follower uses fake samples to
tamper with the leader’s information acquisition.
Specifically, when the leader learns an SSE by querying the follower’s best responses,
the follower can use fake best responses to change the SSE learned by the algorithm. As
recently explored by Gan et al. (2019b), one particular approach the follower can employ,
termed imitative follower deception, is to imitate best responses implied by payoffs that are
different from the actual ones. The key to the success of such a deceptive behavior is thus
to pinpoint the fake payoffs that could make the leader learn an SSE in which the actual
utility of the follower is maximized. In the scenario studied by Gan et al. (2019b), this
task is trivial for the follower as his choices are limited to a finite set of explicitly given
payoff matrices, whose size is bounded by the size of the problem representation; thus, to
efficiently find out the optimal payoffs, the follower can simply enumerate all possible payoff
matrices and see which one of them leads to the best outcome.
In this paper, we consider the general version of the optimal imitative deception problem,
where the follower is allowed to imitate any payoff matrix, without restrictions on the space
of possible values. This general version has been considered in two very recent papers (Gan
et al., 2019a; Nguyen & Xu, 2019), but only in the specific context of Stackelberg security
games. Besides that, no progress has been made for general Stackelberg games. In this
paper, we aim to fill this gap, by completely resolving this computational problem.
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1.1 Our Contribution
We explore how a follower can optimally deceive a learning leader in Stackelberg games
by misreporting his payoff matrix, and we study the tractability of the corresponding opti-
mization problem. As mentioned above, our objective is to compute an optimal fake payoff
matrix, that leads to the best SSE for the follower. However, unlike the related literature,
we do not impose any restrictions on the space from which the payoffs are selected or on
the type of the game. By exploiting an intuitive characterization of all strategy profiles
that can be induced as SSEs in Stackelberg games, we show that it is always possible for
the follower to compute an optimal payoff matrix in polynomial time, irrespective of the
specific learning algorithm employed by the leader. Furthermore, we strengthen this result
to resolve possible equilibrium selection issues, by showing that the follower can construct
a payoff matrix that induces a unique SSE, in which his utility is maximized up to some
arbitrarily small loss.
Our characterization of inducible strategy profiles establishes an interesting connection
between the follower’s deception and the leader’s maximin utility: through deception, the
follower can induce almost any (fake) SSE if and only if the leader obtains at least her
maximin utility in this equilibrium. Given that the maximin utility is always attainable
without any additional information about the opponent, this means that the follower can
exploit the leader’s lack of information to the maximum degree, despite the leader’s attempts
to learn additional information. This connection to the maximin utility also reflects the
findings of Gan et al. (2019a) on Stackelberg security games, who showed that the optimal
deception in such games is to use fake payoffs that make the game zero-sum, whereby the
leader obtains exactly the maximin utility. In the generic Stackelberg games we study in
this paper, the optimal deception may, but need not always, lead to zero-sum games; hence,
we fully characterize the space of inducible strategy profiles, which requires completely
different techniques.
1.2 Other Related Work
Our paper is related to an emerging line of work at the intersection of machine learning and
algorithmic game theory, dealing with scenarios where the samples used for training learning
algorithms are controlled by strategic agents, who aim to optimize their personal benefit.
Indicatively, there has been recent interest in the analysis of the effect of strategic behavior
on the efficiency of existing algorithms, as well as the design of algorithms resilient to
strategic manipulation for linear regression (Ben-Porat & Tennenholtz, 2019; Chen et al.,
2018; Dekel et al., 2010; Hossain & Shah, 2020; Perote & Perote-Peña, 2004; Waggoner
et al., 2015) and classification (Chen et al., 2019; Dong et al., 2018; Meir et al., 2012; Zhang
et al., 2019).
Beyond the strategic considerations above, our work is also related to the study of query
protocols for learning game-theoretic equilibria. In this setting, as in ours, algorithms for
computing equilibria via utility and best response queries are a natural starting point. For
utility queries, there has been much work in proving exponential lower bounds for random-
ized computation of exact, approximate and well-supported Nash equilibria (Babichenko
& Rubinstein, 2017; Babichenko, 2016; Chen et al., 2017; Goldberg & Roth, 2016; Hart
& Mansour, 2010; Hart & Nisan, 2018), as well as providing query-efficient protocols for
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approximate Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games, congestion games (Fearnley
et al., 2015), anonymous games (Goldberg & Turchetta, 2017), and large games (Goldberg
et al., 2019). Best response queries are weaker than utility queries, but they arise natu-
rally in practice, and are also expressive enough to implement fictitious play, a dynamic
first proposed by Brown (1949), and proven to converge by Robinson (1951) for two-player
zero-sum games to an approximate Nash equilibrium. In terms of equilibrium computation,
Goldberg and Marmolejo-Cosśıo (2018) also provide query-efficient algorithms for comput-
ing approximate Nash equilibria for bimatrix games via best response queries provided one
agent has a constant number of strategies.
Finally, learning via incentive queries in games is directly related to the theory of pref-
erence elicitation, where the goal is to mine information about the private parameters of
the agents by interacting with them (Blum et al., 2004; Lahaie & Parkes, 2004; Zinkevich
et al., 2003; Goldberg et al., 2020). This has many applications, most notably combina-
torial auctions, where access to the valuation functions of the agents is achieved via value
or demand queries (Blumrosen & Nisan, 2007; Conen & Sandholm, 2001; Nisan & Segal,
2006).
2. Preliminaries
A Stackelberg game is a sequential game between a leader and a follower.1 The leader
commits to a strategy, and the follower then acts upon observing this commitment. We
consider finite games, in which the leader and the follower have m and n pure strategies
at their disposal, respectively, and their utilities for all possible outcomes are given by the
matrices uL, uF ∈ Rm×n. The entries uL(i, j) and uF (i, j) denote the utilities of the leader
and the follower under pure strategy profile (i, j) ∈ [m] × [n], where we use the notation
[k] = {1, . . . , k} for any positive integer k. We use G = (uL, uF ) to denote the Stackelberg
game with payoff matrices uL and uF ; we omit m and n in the tuple as they are clear from
context. The games we consider are general-sum games, with no restriction on the matrices
uL, uF ∈ Rm×n.
The players are allowed to employ mixed strategies, whereby they randomize over actions
in their strategy set. A mixed strategy of the leader is a probability distribution over [m],
denoted by x ∈ ∆m−1 = {x ≥ 0 :
∑
i∈[m] xi = 1}. By slightly abusing notation, we
let uL(x, j) =
∑
i∈[m] xi · uL(i, j) be the expected utility of the leader when she plays the
mixed strategy x and the follower plays a pure strategy j. Similarly, we define uF (x, j) =∑
i∈[m] xi · uF (i, j) for the follower. For a given mixed strategy x ∈ ∆m−1 of the leader, we
say that a pure strategy j ∈ [n] is a follower best response if uF (x, j) = max`∈[n] uF (x, `); we
denote the set of all follower best responses to x by BR(x) ⊆ [n] and refer to the function
BR as the best response correspondence of the follower, or the BR correspondence. We can
further generalize the follower’s response to be a mixed strategy y ∈ ∆n−1, but this is
unnecessary as will become clear below.
An SSE is the standard solution concept in Stackelberg games. It captures the situation
where the leader commits to a mixed strategy that maximizes her expected utility, while
taking into account the follower’s best response to her commitment. It is assumed that
1. By convention, we will refer to the leader as a female and the follower as a male.
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the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader when he has multiple best responses, and
without loss of generality the best response chosen is always a pure strategy. This optimistic
assumption is justified by the fact that such tie-breaking behavior can often be enforced by
an infinitesimal perturbation in the leader’s strategy (von Stengel & Zamir, 2004). Hence,
in the definition below, we only consider pure strategies of the follower.2
Definition 2.1 (Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE)). A strategy profile (x, j) is
an SSE of the game G = (uL, uF ) if
(x, j) ∈ arg max
y∈∆m−1, `∈BR(y)
uL(y, `).
Note that the set of SSEs of the game G = (uL, uF ) actually only depends on (uL,BR).
Thus, with a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes also denote the game as G =
(uL,BR), where the preferences of the follower are directly given by a best response corre-
spondence BR (which may or may not correspond to a payoff matrix uF ∈ Rm×n).
2.1 Learning SSEs and Deceptive Follower Behavior
We consider the scenario where the leader has full knowledge of her utility matrix uL, and
aims to compute an SSE by interacting with the follower and gleaning information about uF .
For example, the leader could observe the follower’s best responses in play (akin to having
query access to BR), or observe the follower’s payoffs at pure strategy profiles during play
(akin to having query access to uF as a function). Hence, this can be cast as the problem of
learning an SSE with a specified notion of query access to information about the follower’s
incentives.
Consider a game G = (uL, uF ). If the follower controls the flow of information to the
leader in this paradigm, he may consider perpetually interacting with the leader as if he
had a different payoff matrix ũF (or a different BR correspondence B̃R), which can make
the leader believe that they are playing the game G̃ = (uL, ũF ) (or G̃ = (uL, B̃R)). This
deceiving power provides the follower with an incentive to act according to G̃ for a judicious
choice of ũF (or B̃R), because the SSEs in G̃ may yield a larger utility (according to uF )
than the SSEs in G. More concretely, the example below shows that the follower can gain an
arbitrarily large benefit by deceiving the leader into playing a different game. The example
also shows that the leader’s utility loss can be arbitrarily bad.











Now, suppose that uL = R and uF = Cα, and let x ∈ [0, 1] represent the probability mass
that the leader (row player) places on the first row (her first strategy); thus, 1 − x is the
probability with which she plays her second strategy. Given this mixed strategy of the
leader, the utilities that the follower expects to derive from her two strategies (columns)
2. When mixed strategies of the follower are considered, a strategy profile (x,y) is an SSE if (x, j) is an
SSE (as in Definition 2.1) for all pure strategies j in the support set of y.
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are uF (x, 1) = 1−x and uF (x, 2) = α. Consequently, the first strategy is a best response of
the follower when x ∈ [0, 1− α], and the second one is a best response when x ∈ (1− α, 1]
(when x = 1− α, the tie is broken in favor of the leader). With this information, it is clear
that an SSE of the game occurs when the leader chooses x = 1− α and the follower plays
his first strategy; in fact, this is the unique SSE when α < 1. As a result, the follower’s
utility is uF (1− α, 1) = α.
However, for any α < 1, the follower has an incentive to deceive the leader into playing a
game G̃ = (R,Cβ) with β ∈ (α, 1), which will improve his true utility (computed according
to the true payoff matrix Cα) in the resulting SSE to u
F (1 − β, 1) = β. The follower can
achieve this by responding to the learning algorithm’s queries optimally according to Cβ
(or by misreporting Cβ as his payoff matrix in scenarios where this information can be
conveyed directly). This is an improvement by a multiplicative factor of β/α, which can be
arbitrarily large when α approaches 0. Meanwhile, the utility of the leader drops from 1−α
to 1− β, which amounts to a multiplicative factor of (1−α)/(1− β) and can be arbitrarily
large when β approaches 1.
2.2 Inducible Strategy Profiles
The ultimate goal of the follower is to identify the SSE that maximizes his true utility, from
the set of SSEs that he can deceive the leader into learning. We will refer to such SSEs as
inducible strategy profiles. At a high level, the follower’s problem can now be expressed as




subject to (x, j) is inducible
(1)
This maximum utility for the follower is called the optimal inducible utility. If the maximum
value is never achieved, then for every ε > 0, we would like to be able to find an inducible
SSE that achieves a value ε-close to the supremum value. We assume that the follower has
full information about the leader’s payoff matrix uL throughout.
As discussed previously, the leader can learn an SSE by querying the best responses of
the follower to particular leader strategies, or by querying more refined information about
the follower’s payoff matrix. Depending on the type of information queried, we can define
various notions of inducible strategy profiles.
In more detail, suppose the leader can only query the best responses of the follower, who
behaves according to some best response correspondence B̃R : ∆m−1 → 2[n] \ {∅}. This
interaction between the leader and the follower leads to a game denoted as G̃ = (uL, B̃R),
where the only information known is B̃R (instead of a payoff matrix implying B̃R). The
definition of B̃R enforces a best response answer to any possible query. Consequently, the
leader learns an SSE (x, j) ∈ arg max
y∈∆m−1, `∈B̃R(y) u
L(y, `), which yields the following
notion of BR-inducible strategy profiles.
Definition 2.3 (BR inducibility). A strategy profile (x, j) is BR-inducible with respect
to uL if there exists a best response correspondence B̃R : ∆m−1 → 2[n]\{∅} such that (x, j)
is an SSE of the game G̃ = (uL, B̃R), in which case we say that (x, j) is induced by B̃R.
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Next, consider the case where the leader can query information about the payoffs of the
follower, who can now behave according to a fake payoff matrix ũF . We refer to the SSEs
of the resulting game G̃ = (uL, ũF ) as payoff-inducible strategy profiles.
Definition 2.4 (Payoff inducibility). A strategy profile (x, j) is said to be payoff-
inducible with respect to uL if there exists ũF ∈ Rm×n such that (x, j) is an SSE in the
game G̃ = (uL, ũF ), in which case we say that (x, j) is induced by ũF .
Clearly, payoff inducibility is stricter than BR inducibility: for every choice of ũF ,
the corresponding best response correspondence B̃R(y) = arg max`∈[n] ũ
F (y, `) induces the
same SSEs as ũF does.
Note that the above definitions only require an inducible strategy profile to be a verifiable
SSE, with respect to the information about the follower’s incentives (either B̃R or ũF ). It
may happen that the resulting game G̃ has multiple SSEs (e.g., the game in Example 2.2
when α = 1), which gives rise to an equilibrium selection issue. Indeed, in practice, it is not
realistic to assume that the follower has any control over which SSE is chosen by the leader
(who moves first in the game), especially when there are SSEs involving different leader
strategies. To address this, and thus completely resolve the optimal deception problem for
the follower, we introduce an even stricter notion of inducibility on top of payoff inducibility,
which requires G̃ to have a unique SSE.
Definition 2.5 (Strong inducibility). A strategy profile (x, j) is said to be strongly
inducible with respect to uL, if there exists a matrix ũF ∈ Rm×n such that (x, j) is the
unique SSE of the game G̃ = (uL, ũF ), in which case we say that (x, j) is strongly induced
by ũF .
In the next sections, we will investigate solutions to (1) under the inducibility notions
above, from the weakest to the strongest. Our general approach is to decompose (1) into
n sub-problems by enumerating all possible follower responses j ∈ [n]. For each response
j, we solve the corresponding optimization problem presented below, and pick the response




subject to (x, j) is inducible
(2)
Hence, our problem reduces to solving (2). As a final remark, one may wonder whether
relaxing the follower’s response in (1) (and in the SSE definition) to a mixed strategy
y ∈ ∆n−1 could improve the optimal inducible utility. This is not the case: If a strategy
profile (x,y) is an SSE in G̃, then (x, j) should also be an SSE for each pure strategy j in
the support set of y, while uF (x, j) ≥ uF (x,y) :=
∑
`∈[n] y` · uF (x, `) should hold for at
least one j in the support set of y.
3. Best Response Inducibility
Let us start our analysis by considering the case in which the leader queries the best re-
sponses of the follower. The aim of the follower is to deceive the leader towards a strategy
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profile that is BR-inducible as defined in Definition 2.3. Indeed, if the follower is allowed to
use an arbitrary B̃R to induce a strategy profile (x, j), he can simply define B̃R as follows:
B̃R(y) =
{
{j} if y = x
arg min`∈[n] u
L(y, `) if y 6= x.
Namely, the follower threatens to choose the worst possible response against any leader
strategy y 6= x, so as to minimize the leader’s incentive to commit to these strategies. This
B̃R will successfully convince the leader that (x, j) is an SSE of G̃ = (uL, B̃R) — hence
inducing (x, j) — if the threat is powerful enough, that is, if
uL(x, j) ≥ min
`∈[n]
uL(y, `) for all y ∈ ∆m−1,
where the left hand side is what the leader obtains by committing to x, and the right hand
side is what she obtains by committing to y 6= x. Equivalently, this means that





where M is exactly the leader’s maximin utility. Indeed, (3) is necessary for (x, j) to be
BR-inducible: if on the contrary uL(x, j) < M , then by committing to





the leader can obtain (at least) her maximin utility, which will be strictly larger than
uL(x, j).
Thus, condition (3) gives a simple criterion for BR inducibility, as well as the following




subject to uL(x, j) ≥M
(4)
Although simple, the B̃R defined above may be far from being one that arises from a
choice of ũF . Hence, we will next move one step closer to our next goal of studying payoff
inducibility, by imposing a stricter condition on B̃R, which is necessary (but not sufficient)
for a strategy profile induced by B̃R to also be payoff-inducible. We will show that, in fact,
the extra condition imposed on B̃R does not compromise its power, and (4) still applies as
a formulation under this stricter notion of BR inducibility. This result will be useful for
analyzing payoff inducibility in Section 4.
3.1 Polytopal BR Correspondence
In a similar vein to Goldberg and Marmolejo-Cosśıo (2018), we require that, for every
` ∈ [n], the set of leader strategies to which ` is a best response is a closed convex polytope,
and the union of all these sets forms a partition of the entire strategy space ∆m−1 (for
example, see the polytope partition of ∆2 in Figure 1). Any best response correspondence
B̃R satisfying this assumption is called polytopal as is formally defined below.
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Definition 3.1 (Polytopal BR correspondence (Goldberg & Marmolejo-Cosśıo, 2018)).




(`) is a closed convex polytope for each ` ∈ [n], and









where relint(H) denotes the relative interior of a set H.
Being polytopal is necessary for B̃R to arise from some payoff matrix. Indeed, the true
best response correspondence BR, which arises from uF , is polytopal: Each BR−1(`) is a
closed convex polytope defined by the hyperplanes uF (y, `) ≥ uF (y, k) for all k ∈ [n] and
the borders of ∆m−1; in addition, ∪n`=1BR
−1(`) = ∆m−1, and for any ` 6= k, the polytopes
BR−1(`) and BR−1(k) only intersect at their borders unless uF (·, `) = uF (·, k). Thus, if the
follower attempts to deceive the leader via a fake B̃R, the leader might spot the deception
in case B̃R is not polytopal.
It turns out that the following correspondence, which we denote as B̃RP, is polytopal
and, as we will shortly show, it is in fact as powerful as any best response correspondence:
B̃RP(y) =

{j} if y ∈ ∆m−1 \ Uj(x)
{j} ∪ arg min`∈[n]\{j} uL(y, `) if y ∈ Uj(x) \ Uj(x)
arg min`∈[n]\{j} u
L(y, `) if y ∈ Uj(x)
where Uj(x) is the closure of
Uj(x) :=
{
y ∈ ∆m−1 : uL(y, j) > uL(x, j)
}
,
and x is the leader’s strategy that we want to induce.3 Intuitively, it is safe for the follower
to respond by playing j against any leader strategy y if uL(y, j) ≤ uL(x, j), in which case
the leader does not strictly prefer commitment y to commitment x. In response to the
other strategies, however, the follower needs to respond differently in order to minimize the
leader’s incentive to commit to these strategies. Therefore, B̃RP will successfully induce
(x, j) if and only if the following holds:





where we use the convention that max∅ = −∞. It is easy to see that B̃RP is indeed
polytopal: B̃R
−1
P (j) = ∆
m−1 \Uj(x) is a closed convex polytope, and the same holds for the
sets B̃R
−1
P (`) defined by the hyperplanes u
L(y, `) ≤ uL(y, k), k ∈ [n] \ {j} and the borders
of Uj(x), which further form a partition of Uj(x).
The next lemma shows that (5) is in fact equivalent to (3), meaning that B̃RP is as
powerful as any B̃R: if (x, j) can be induced by an arbitrary B̃R then it can also be induced
by B̃RP.
3. Note that the use of Uj(x), instead of the set
{
y ∈ ∆m−1 : uL(y, j) ≥ uL(x, j)
}
, is important: when
uL(y, j) = uL(x, j) for all y ∈ ∆m−1, these two sets define different behaviors.
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uL =











Figure 1: No payoff matrix ũF realizes the polytopal BR correspondence B̃RP, such that ` ∈ B̃RP if
and only if y ∈ R`, where R1 = {y ∈ ∆2 : y1 ≥ y2 + y3}, R2 = {y ∈ ∆2 : y1 ≤ y2 + y3 and y2 ≥ y3},
and R3 = {y ∈ ∆2 : y1 ≤ y2 + y3 and y2 ≤ y3}.
Lemma 3.2. uL(x, j) ≥M if and only if uL(x, j) ≥ max
y∈Uj(x) min`∈[n]\{j} u
L(y, `).
Proof. Recall that we want to show that uL(x, j) ≥M if and only if





where M is the maximin utility of the leader. We show that (6) does not hold if and only
if uL(x, j) < M .
Suppose that (6) does not hold. Then uL(x, j) < max
y∈Uj(x) min`∈[n]\{j} u
L(y, `) by
definition, which implies that Uj(x) 6= ∅. By the continuity of min`∈[n]\{j} uL(·, `), there
exists y∗ ∈ Uj(x) such that
uL(x, j) < min
`∈[n]\{j}
uL(y∗, `).
By the definition of Uj(x), we also have u
L(x, j) < uL(y∗, j). Thus,
uL(x, j) < min
`∈[n]




uL(y, `) = M.
Conversely, suppose that uL(x, j) < M . Let y∗ ∈ arg maxy∈∆m−1 min`∈[n] uL(y, `).
Thus, M = min`∈[n] u
L(y∗, `), and we have
uL(x, j) < M = min
`∈[n]
uL(y∗, `) ≤ uL(y∗, j)
which implies that y∗ ∈ Uj(x). It follows that M = maxy∈Uj(x) min`∈[n] u
L(y, `) and thus









so (6) does not hold.
We summarize our results from this section in Theorem 3.3. At this point, it might be
tempting to think that with the polytopal constraint imposed, we would also be able to
construct an explicit payoff matrix ũF to implement B̃RP. Unfortunately, this is not true
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as Example 3.4 illustrates. Surprisingly though, in the next section we will show that, even
though we cannot construct a payoff matrix that implements B̃RP exactly, every strategy
profile (x, j) that is B̃RP-inducible is in fact also payoff-inducible. We also present an
efficient algorithm for computing a payoff matrix ũF to induce such (x, j).
Theorem 3.3. A strategy profile (x, j) is BR-inducible if and only if uL(x, j) ≥ M . The
result holds even if we require the best response correspondence to be polytopal.
Example 3.4. Consider a 3 × 3 game with the leader payoff matrix given in Figure 1.
Let B̃RP be a polytopal BR correspondence defined by the regions R1, R2, and R3 in
Figure 1, such that ` ∈ B̃RP if and only if y ∈ R`. This best response behavior cannot be
realized by any payoff matrix. To see this, suppose B̃RP is realized by some ũ
F ∈ R3×3.
Let x = (12 ,
1










4). We have B̃RP(z) = {1, 2, 3} and
B̃RP(w) = {1, 3}. This means that
uL(z, 1) = uL(z, 3) = uL(z, 2), and uL(w, 1) = uL(w, 3) > uL(w, 2).
Since x = 2z−w, by the linearity of the utility function, we then have uL(x, 1) = uL(x, 3) <
uL(x, 2), which contradicts the fact that B̃RP(x) = {1, 2}.
4. Payoff Inducibility
In this section, we will show that every strategy profile that can be induced by B̃RP is also
payoff-inducible, and a corresponding payoff matrix can be efficiently constructed. Recall
that M = maxy∈∆m−1 min`∈[n] u
L(y, `) is the maximin utility of the leader. We will show
the following characterization as one of our key results, which enables us to use the LP in
(4) to efficiently compute a payoff matrix that achieves the optimal inducible utility.
Theorem 4.1. A strategy profile (x, j) is payoff-inducible if and only if uL(x, j) ≥ M .
Furthermore, a matrix ũF inducing (x, j) can be constructed in polynomial time.
One direction of the characterization is easy to show. Indeed, if (x, j) is payoff-inducible,
then it is also BR-inducible, and as seen in Section 3, it holds that uL(x, j) ≥M .
Now consider any profile (x, j) such that uL(x, j) ≥ M . Recall that Uj(x) = {y ∈
∆m−1 : uL(y, j) > uL(x, j)}. Without loss of generality, in what follows, we can also
assume that Uj(x) 6= ∅: if Uj(x) = ∅, then (x, j) will be an SSE if the follower always
responds by playing j; this can easily be achieved by claiming that j strictly dominates all
other strategies, i.e., by letting ũF (i, j) = 1 and ũF (i, `) = 0 for all i ∈ [m] and ` ∈ [n]\{j}.
We begin by analyzing the following payoff function that forms the basis of our approach.
Let Ŝ ⊆ [n] \ {j} and pick k ∈ arg min
`∈Ŝ u
L(x, `) arbitrarily. For all y ∈ ∆m−1, let
ũF (y, `) =

−uL(y, `) if ` ∈ Ŝ
−uL(y, k)− 1 if ` ∈ [n] \ (Ŝ ∪ {j})
−uL(y, k) + α
(
uL(x, j)− uL(y, j)
)
if ` = j
(7)
where α > 0 is a constant. In what follows, we will let B̃R denote the best response
correspondence corresponding to ũF , i.e., B̃R(y) = arg max`∈[n] ũ
F (y, `). Note that once
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Ŝ and α are given, we can compute the payoff matrix corresponding to ũF in polynomial
time. Then, the hope is that with appropriately chosen Ŝ and α, this payoff matrix will
induce (x, j). Indeed, ũF has the following nice properties:
i. Strategy j is indeed a best response to x, since, by the choice of k we have
ũF (x, j) = −uL(x, k) ≥ −min
`∈Ŝ
uL(x, `) = max
`∈Ŝ
ũF (x, `).
ii. Any ` ∈ [n] \ (Ŝ ∪ {j}) cannot be a best response of the follower as it is strictly
dominated by k, i.e., ũF (y, `) < ũF (y, k) for all y ∈ ∆m−1. Thus, B̃R(y) ⊆ Ŝ ∪ {j}
for all y ∈ ∆m−1.
iii. If j is a best response to some y ∈ ∆m−1, then uL(y, j) ≤ uL(x, j). Indeed, j ∈ B̃R(y)
implies that
ũF (y, j) = max
`∈[n]
ũF (y, `) ≥ ũF (y, k).
Substituting ũF (y, j) = −uL(y, k) + α
(
uL(x, j)− uL(y, j)
)
into this inequality and
rearranging the terms immediately gives uL(y, j) ≤ uL(x, j).
iv. If any ` ∈ Ŝ is a best response to some y ∈ ∆m−1, then it holds that ũF (y, `) =
max
`′∈Ŝ ũ
F (y, `′), which implies that
uL(y, `) = min
`′∈Ŝ
uL(y, `′). (8)
Therefore, if it also holds for the y in (iv) that
min
`′∈Ŝ
uL(y, `′) ≤ uL(x, j),
then by (8) we will have uL(y, `) ≤ uL(x, j) for every ` ∈ B̃R(y) ∩ Ŝ. This, together with
(ii) and (iii), will imply that uL(x, j) ≥ uL(y, `) for every ` ∈ B̃R(y). Therefore, (x, j) will
indeed form an SSE given that j ∈ B̃R(x) according to (i). We state this observation as
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. If min
`′∈Ŝ u
L(y, `′) ≤ uL(x, j) holds for all y ∈ ∆m−1 such that B̃R(y)∩ Ŝ 6=
∅, then the payoff matrix defined by (7) induces (x, j).
Theorem 4.1 then follows from the following proposition, which we prove in Section 4.1
below.
Proposition 4.3. If uL(x, j) ≥ M and Uj(x) 6= ∅, then we can construct Ŝ ⊆ [n] \ {j}
and α > 0 in polynomial time, with which the condition of Lemma 4.2 holds for ũF defined
by (7).
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4.1 Proof of Proposition 4.3
The proof relies on Farkas’ Lemma presented below.
Lemma 4.4 (Farkas’ Lemma (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2014)). Let A ∈ Rn1×n2 and b ∈ Rn1.
Then exactly one of the following statements is true:
1. there exists z ∈ Rn2 such that Az = b and z ≥ 0;
2. there exists z ∈ Rn1 such that ATz ≥ 0 and b · z < 0.
Consider any strategy profile (x, j) with uL(x, j) ≥ M and Uj(x) 6= ∅. We begin by
taking care of a simple case, as an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.2.
Corollary 4.5. A matrix ũF that induces (x, j) can be constructed in polynomial time if it
holds that





Proof. Let Ŝ = [n] \ {j}. Then, for every y ∈ ∆m−1, we immediately obtain that




uL(y, `) ≥ min
`∈Ŝ
uL(y, `)
By Lemma 4.2, the payoff matrix defined by (7) (with, say, α = 1) then induces (x, j), and
can clearly be computed in polynomial time.
The more challenging case is when (9) does not hold (e.g., the case with the profile (x, 1)
in Example 3.4). In what follows, we prove Proposition 4.3 by showing that there is still a
choice of Ŝ and α that leads to the condition in Lemma 4.2, even when (9) does not hold.
Thus, from now on, we assume that
uL(x, j) < M−j . (10)
We define the following useful components. By Lemma 3.2 and the assumption that
uL(x, j) ≥M , we know that





Since Uj(x) 6= ∅, there exists y∗ ∈ Uj(x) such that
min
`∈[n]\{j}
uL(y∗, `) = V, (12)
which can be computed efficiently by solving an LP (i.e., maximize µ, subject to µ ≤ uL(y, `)
for all ` ∈ [n] \ {j} and y ∈ Uj(x)). We then let
S = {` ∈ [n] \ {j} : uL(y∗, `) = V }.
Before we proceed, we prove two useful technical results.
519
Birmpas, Gan, Hollender, Marmolejo-Cosśıo, Rajgopal, & Voudouris
Lemma 4.6. uL(y∗, j) = uL(x, j).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that uL(y∗, j) 6= uL(x, j). Since y∗ ∈ Uj(x),
we have that uL(y∗, j) ≥ uL(x, j), so it must be that uL(y∗, j) > uL(x, j).
The assumption (10) that uL(x, j) < M−j implies that there exists ŷ ∈ ∆m−1 such that
min
`∈[n]\{j}
uL(ŷ, `) > uL(x, j) ≥ V,
where we also use (11). Now that min`∈[n]\{j} u
L(y∗, `) = V by (12), by the concavity of
min`∈[n]\{j} u
L(·, `), it follows that min`∈[n]\{j} uL(z, `) > V for all z on the segment [ŷ,y∗);
z ∈ ∆m−1 as ∆m−1 is convex. Now that we have uL(y∗, j) > uL(x, j) under our assumption,
when z is sufficiently close to y∗, we can have uL(z, j) ≥ uL(x, j) and hence, z ∈ Uj(x).





uL(y, `) ≥ min
`∈[n]\{j}
uL(z, `) > V.
Lemma 4.7. min`∈S u
L(y, `) < V for all y ∈ Uj(x).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists ŷ ∈ Uj(x) such that
min
`∈S
uL(ŷ, `) ≥ V.
By assumption (10) that uL(x, j) < M−j , we have that there exists z ∈ ∆m−1 such that
min`∈[n]\{j} u
L(z, `) > uL(x, j) ≥ V , which immediately yields the following, given that
S ⊆ [n] \ {j} by definition:
min
`∈S
uL(z, `) > V.
By definition, uL(y∗, `) = V for all ` ∈ S, which also implies that uL(y∗, `) > V for all
` ∈ [n] \ ({j} ∪ S) (otherwise, we would have min`∈[n]\{j}uL(y∗,`) < V ). Thus, we have
min
`∈S
uL(y∗, `) = V and min
`∈[n]\({j}∪S)
uL(y∗, `) > V.
Now consider a point w on the segment (y∗, ŷ]. Since y∗ ∈ Uj(x) and ŷ ∈ Uj(x),
i.e., uL(y∗, j) ≥ uL(x, j) and uL(ŷ, j) > uL(x, j), we have uL(w, j) > uL(x, j) and hence,
w ∈ Uj(x). In addition, by continuity, when w is sufficiently close to y∗, we have
min
`∈[n]\({j}∪S)
uL(w, `) > V. (13)
By concavity of the function min`∈S u




uL(w, `) ≥ V. (14)
Analogously, we can find a point w′ ∈ Uj(x) on the segment (w, z], such that (13) and
(14) hold for w′ while (14) is strict, in particular. Thus, we have
min
`∈[n]\{j}





which is a contradiction as w′ ∈ Uj(x).
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Accordingly, we can write the utility function as
uL(y, `) = g` · y + uL(m, `),
where g` ∈ Rm−1 and its i-th component is g`,i = uL(i, `)− uL(m, `); “·” denotes the inner
product. Hence, we have
uL(y, `) = g` · (y − y∗) + uL(y∗, `) =
{
g` · (y − y∗) + V if ` ∈ S
gj · (y − y∗) + uL(x, j) if ` = j
(15)
where uL(y∗, `) = V for all ` ∈ S by the definition of S, and uL(y∗, j) = uL(x, j) by
Lemma 4.6. Note that since Uj(x) 6= ∅, it must be that gj 6= 0.
We also write the m boundary conditions that define ∆m−1 as ei · y ≥ βi. Namely, for
each i ∈ [m−1], let ei ∈ Rm−1 be the i-th unit vector and βi = 0, while em = (−1, . . . ,−1) ∈
Rm−1 and βm = −1. Thus, ∆m−1 = {y ∈ Rm−1 : ei · y ≥ βi for all i ∈ [m]}. Let
B = {i ∈ [m] : ei · y∗ = βi}
be the set of boundary conditions that are tight for y∗. Note that for any y ∈ ∆m−1 we
have
ei · (y − y∗) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ B. (16)
We can now prove the following result using Farkas’ Lemma (Lemma 4.4), which allows
us to express −gj as a non-negative linear combination of g`’s and ei’s.
Lemma 4.8. −gj can be expressed as a non-negative linear combination of {g` : ` ∈




i∈B µiei, where λ` ≥ 0 and µi ≥ 0.
Proof. We use Farkas’ Lemma (Lemma 4.4) and let n1 = m − 1 and n2 = |S| + |B|. The
columns of A are exactly the vectors {g` : ` ∈ S} ∪ {ei : i ∈ B}. We set b = −gj . Note
that the first alternative of Farkas’ Lemma immediately yields the statement we want to
prove. Thus, we set out to prove that the second alternative cannot hold.
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists z ∈ Rm−1 such that ATz ≥ 0
and b · z < 0, i.e., g` · z ≥ 0 for all ` ∈ S, ei · z ≥ 0 for all i ∈ B, and gj · z > 0.
Then, by picking δ > 0 sufficiently small, it holds for y = y∗ + δz that:
• By (15), we have the following for all ` ∈ S:
uL(y, `) = g` · (y − y∗) + V = δg` · z + V ≥ V.
In addition,
uL(y, j) = gj · (y − y∗) + uL(y∗, j) = δgj · z + uL(x, j) > uL(x, j).
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• y ∈ ∆m−1: For i ∈ B, we immediately obtain that ei ·y = ei · (y∗+ δz) ≥ ei ·y∗ = βi,
which means that these boundary conditions are satisfied. For i ∈ [m] \ B, we know
that ei · y∗ > βi and thus by picking δ > 0 small enough, we can ensure that ei · y =
ei · y∗ + δ(ei · z) ≥ βi.
Thus, it follows that y ∈ Uj(x) and min`∈S uL(y, `) ≥ V . But this cannot hold according
to Lemma 4.7.
To complete the proof of Proposition 4.3, we express −gj as a non-negative linear
combination of the vectors {g` : ` ∈ S} ∪ {ei : i ∈ B}. By Lemma 4.8 we know that this
is feasible and it is easy to see that we can find the coefficients in polynomial time (e.g.




i∈B µiei, where λ` ≥ 0 for every
` ∈ S and µi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ B. Let Ŝ = {` ∈ S : λ` > 0}. We will argue that Ŝ 6= ∅.




i∈B µiei, and we have ei · (y−y∗) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ ∆m−1
and i ∈ B by (16), it follows that, for all y ∈ ∆m−1, we have
−gj · (y − y∗) =
∑
`∈S
λ`g` · (y − y∗) +
∑
i∈B








λ`g` · (y − y∗), (17)
where the last transition is due to the fact that λ` = 0 for all ` ∈ S \ Ŝ, as implied by the
definition of Ŝ.
Since Uj(x) 6= ∅, consider any y ∈ Uj(x). By definition, this means that uL(y, j) >
uL(x, j), which further implies that gj · (y−y∗) > 0 since uL(y, j) = gj · (y−y∗) +uL(x, j)
by (15). By (17), we then have ∑
`∈Ŝ
λ`g` · (y − y∗) < 0.
Hence, Ŝ 6= ∅.
It remains to show that with the above Ŝ and, in particular, α = 1/λk (recall that k ∈
arg min
`∈Ŝ u
L(x, `)), the condition in Lemma 4.2 holds, i.e., we prove that min
`∈Ŝ u
L(y, `) ≤
uL(x, j) holds for all y ∈ ∆m−1 such that B̃R(y) ∩ Ŝ 6= ∅.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exists y ∈ ∆m−1 such that B̃R(y) ∩
Ŝ 6= ∅, but uL(y, `) > uL(x, j) for all ` ∈ Ŝ. By (11), we have uL(x, j) ≥ V , and thus
uL(y, `) > V for all ` ∈ Ŝ. Since we have uL(y, `) = g` · (y − y∗) + V according to (15), it
follows that
g` · (y − y∗) > 0
for all ` ∈ Ŝ. Using (17) and the fact that k ∈ Ŝ by our choice, we then obtain
−gj · (y − y∗) ≥
∑
`∈Ŝ
λ`g` · (y − y∗) ≥ λkgk · (y − y∗).
522
Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
By (15), we have
uL(x, j)− uL(y, j) = −gj · (y − y∗).
Recall that it is defined that ũF (y, j) = −uL(y, k)+α
(
uL(x, j)− uL(y, j)
)
as in (7). Using
the above two equations and (15), we then obtain:
ũF (y, j) = −uL(y, k) + α
(
uL(x, j)− uL(y, j)
)
= −gk · (y − y∗)− V − αgj · (y − y∗)
≥ −V + (αλk − 1)gk · (y − y∗)
= −V.
However, by (7) we also have ũF (y, `) = −uL(y, `) if ` ∈ Ŝ, which implies that for all
` ∈ Ŝ it holds that
ũF (y, j) ≥ −V > −uL(y, `) = ũF (y, `).
Hence, B̃R(y) ∩ Ŝ = ∅, which contradicts our assumption. This concludes the proof of
Proposition 4.3.
5. Robustness with Respect to Equilibrium Selection
As discussed in Section 2, a weakness of BR- and payoff-inducible strategy profiles is that
the resulting games may have multiple SSEs, in which case the follower depends on the
leader to choose the SSE that maximizes his utility. To avoid this, in this section, we turn
our attention to strong inducibility (see Definition 2.5) and attempt to find a payoff matrix
ũF such that G̃ has a unique SSE.
We begin with an example showcasing that, in general, the best strongly inducible profile
can be much worse than the best payoff-inducible profile.
Example 5.1. Consider a 3 × 2 game G = (uL, uF ) with the payoff matrices given in
Figure 2. Note that the follower obtains positive utility only by playing his strategy 1.
Now, observe that the SSE (x∗, 1), x∗ = (0, 0, 1) ∈ ∆2, is payoff-inducible and yields utility
1 for the follower: it can be induced by any payoff matrix in which strategy 1 of the follower
strictly dominates all other strategies. However, such a payoff matrix will also induce other
SSEs, e.g., (y∗, 1) with y∗ = (1, 0, 0) ∈ ∆2. Indeed, it holds that no profile of the form (y, 1)
can be strongly induced, and thus the optimal utility the follower can obtain at a strongly
inducible profile is 0. To see this, first note that, as seen above, if the follower claims that
strategy 1 is his unique best response for all points in ∆2, then the SSE is not unique. On
the other hand, if strategy 2 is a best response at some point z ∈ ∆2, then (y, 1) will not
be an SSE, since for the leader uL(y, 1) < uL(z, 2) for any y, z ∈ ∆2.
The problem in Example 5.1 stems from the following observation: if the follower reports
a payoff matrix such that strategy 1 is the unique best response for all points in the domain,
then there are multiple SSEs. This can be thought of as a “degenerate” case, since it would
occur with probability 0, if the payoffs of the leader were drawn uniformly at random in
[0, 1]. We formalize this as follows.
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Figure 2: A game where the optimal inducible utility is 1, but the optimal strongly inducible utility
is 0.
uL =














Figure 3: A non-max-degenerate game for which the optimal inducible utility cannot be achieved
by any strongly inducible profile.
Definition 5.2 (Max-degeneracy). A leader payoff matrix uL is said to be max-degenerate,
if there exists j ∈ [n] such that | arg maxi∈[m] uL(i, j)| > 1.
We next provide an example showing that even when uL is not max-degenerate, we
cannot hope to exactly achieve the optimal inducible utility via a strongly inducible profile.
Example 5.3. Consider a 3 × 2 game with the leader and follower payoff matrices given
in Figure 3. It is easy to check that uL is not max-degenerate. Now, observe that the
maximin utility of the leader is M = 1/2 and is achieved at the point y∗ = (12 ,
1
2 , 0) ∈ ∆
2.
Let x∗ = (0, 0, 1) ∈ ∆2. Since uL(x∗, 1) = 1/2 ≥M , it follows that (x∗, 1) is payoff-inducible
by Theorem 4.1. Indeed, the partition (R1, R2) of ∆
2 in Figure 3 shows how (x∗, 1) can
be induced. Note that uF (x∗, 1) = 1, while any profile different from (x∗, 1) yields utility
strictly less than 1 for the follower. We will now show that (x∗, 1) cannot be strongly
induced, which implies that any strongly inducible profile gives utility strictly less than 1
to the follower. Indeed, suppose that (x∗, 1) is induced by some ũF . If by ũF strategy 1 is
a best response to y∗, then (x∗, 1) cannot be the unique SSE, since uL(x∗, 1) = uL(y∗, 1).
On the other hand, if strategy 2 is the only best response to y∗, then there exists some
sufficiently small δ > 0 such that strategy 2 is also a best response to w∗ = (12 − δ,
1
2 + δ, 0)
(see Figure 3). However, this means that (x∗, 1) cannot be an SSE, since uL(x∗, 1) = 1/2
and uL(w∗, 2) = 1/2 + δ.
As a result, unlike in the previous section, here we cannot hope to solve the problem
exactly. However, the next theorem shows that we can approximate the optimal utility with
arbitrarily good precision.
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Theorem 5.4. If uL is not max-degenerate, then for any ε > 0, the follower can strongly
induce a profile (x, j) that yields the optimal inducible utility up to an additive loss of at most
ε. Furthermore, a matrix ũF strongly inducing (x, j) can be constructed in time polynomial
in log(1/ε) (and the size of the representation of the game).
Proof. Let (x∗, j) be a payoff-inducible profile that yields the optimal inducible payoff for
the follower. By Theorem 4.1, such a profile can be computed in polynomial time.




subject to x ∈ ∆m−1
uF (x, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j)− ε
uL(x, j) = uL(x∗, j) + δ
(18)
Note that this LP can be solved in time polynomial in log(1/ε). Furthermore, note that the
polytope of feasible points is not empty since δ = 0 and x = x∗ satisfy all the constraints.
Finally, the LP is not unbounded since δ can be at most maxi∈[m] u
L(i, j)− uL(x∗, j).
In the rest of this proof let δ and x denote an optimal solution to this LP. Note that
we can in particular assume that x is a vertex of the convex polytope Pδ = {y ∈ ∆m−1 :
uL(y, j) = uL(x∗, j) + δ}. Indeed, given a solution δ,x to LP (18), if x is not a vertex of




subject to y ∈ ∆m−1
uL(y, j) = uL(x∗, j) + δ
It is known that a solution of an LP that is also a vertex of the feasible polytope can be
computed in polynomial time (Grötschel et al., 1981). Note that in this case the feasible
polytope is exactly Pδ. Let y be an optimal solution that is a vertex of Pδ. We know that
x ∈ Pδ and uF (x, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j)− ε, which implies that uF (y, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j)− ε. But this
means that δ,y is also an optimal solution to the original LP (18). Thus, by letting x := y,
we indeed have that x is a vertex of the convex polytope Pδ.
Let us first handle the case where δ = 0 by showing that (x∗, j) itself can be strongly
induced. Since δ = 0, it follows that Uj(x
∗) = ∅. Indeed, if there exists ŷ ∈ ∆m−1
with uL(ŷ, j) > uL(x∗, j), then there exists y on the segment (x∗, ŷ] such that uF (y, j) ≥
uF (x∗, j)−ε (when y is sufficiently close to x∗) and uL(y, j) > uL(x∗, j), a contradiction to
the optimality of δ = 0. Now, given that Uj(x
∗) = ∅, we have that uL(y, j) ≤ uL(x∗, j) for
all y ∈ ∆m−1. But since uL is not max-degenerate (in the sense of Definition 5.2), it follows
that in fact uL(y, j) < uL(x∗, j) for all y ∈ ∆m−1 \ {x∗}. Thus, if the follower always best
responds with strategy j, then (x∗, j) will be the unique SSE. As seen before, it is easy
to implement this behavior by reporting ũF (i, j) = 1 and ũF (i, `) = 0 for all i ∈ [m] and
` ∈ [n] \ {j}.
In the rest of this proof, we consider the case δ > 0 and show that (x, j) can be strongly
induced. Since uF (x, j) ≥ uF (x∗, j)− ε, this means that at (x, j) the follower achieves the
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optimal inducible utility up to an additive error of ε. Using the same notation as in the
proof of Proposition 4.3, we let
B = {i ∈ [m] : ei · x = βi}
denote the set of boundary conditions of ∆m−1 that are tight for x. Note that since x is a
vertex of the polytope Pδ, it follows that B 6= ∅. We let h =
∑
i∈B ei. As in the proof of
Proposition 4.3, we have that for all y ∈ ∆m−1 it holds that
h · (y − x) =
∑
i∈B
ei · (y − x) ≥ 0. (19)
Furthermore, since x is a vertex of Pδ, it follows that for all y ∈ Pδ \ {x} there exists i ∈ B
such that ei · (y − x) > 0, and thus
h · (y − x) > 0. (20)
Indeed, if ei · (y−x) = 0 for all i ∈ B for some y ∈ Pδ \ {x}, this would contradict the fact
that x is a vertex of Pδ (i.e. the unique point in Pδ for which the boundary conditions in B
are tight).
We are now ready to construct the payoff matrix reported by the follower. Pick an
arbitrary k ∈ arg min`∈[n]\{j} uL(x, `). For all y ∈ ∆m−1 let
ũF (y, `) =
{
−uL(y, `) if ` ∈ [n] \ {j}
−uL(y, k) + α
(
uL(x, j)− uL(y, j)
)





∣∣uL(i, `)∣∣+m) /δ > 0. Note that we can compute the payoff
matrix corresponding to this utility function in polynomial time. In the remainder of this
proof, we show that (x, j) is the unique SSE of the game (uL, ũF ).
Clearly, j is a best response at x, since
ũF (x, j) = −uL(x, k) = − min
`∈[n]\{j}
uL(x, `) = max
`∈[n]\{j}
ũF (x, `),
by the choice of k.
Next, let us show that if j is a best response at some y ∈ ∆m−1 \ {x}, then uL(y, j) <




uL(x, j)− uL(y, j)
)
≥ h · (y − x). (22)
Since h · (y − x) ≥ 0 by (19), and α > 0, it follows that uL(x, j) ≥ uL(y, j). It remains to
show that uL(x, j) 6= uL(y, j). But if uL(x, j) = uL(y, j), then y ∈ Pδ \ {x} and so by (20)
we have h · (y − x) > 0, which contradicts (22).
Finally, it remains to show that if ` ∈ [n] \ {j} is a best response at some y ∈ ∆m−1,
then it must be that uL(y, `) < uL(x, j): Indeed, if ` ∈ [n] \ {j} is a best response at y,
then in particular ũF (y, j) ≤ ũF (y, `), which by (21) means that
α
(
uL(x, j)− uL(y, j)
)
≤ −uL(y, `) + uL(y, k) + h · (y − x)
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by the choice of α. Thus, we obtain that uL(x, j) − uL(y, j) ≤ δ, which implies that
uL(y, j) ≥ uL(x∗, j), i.e. y ∈ Uj(x∗) (since Uj(x∗) 6= ∅). Since (x∗, j) is payoff-inducible,
which means that uL(x∗, j) ≥M , we can use Lemma 3.2 to obtain
uL(x, j) = uL(x∗, j) + δ > uL(x∗, j) ≥ min
`′∈[n]\{j}
uL(y, `′) = uL(y, `)
where the last equality comes from the fact that ` is a best response at y, i.e., in particular
ũF (y, `) = max`′∈[n]\{j} ũ
F (y, `′).
6. Conclusion and Future Work
Our work — essentially establishing that the follower can always optimally and efficiently
deceive the leader — demonstrates the power of exploiting information asymmetry in Stack-
elberg games. Indeed, we have shown that the follower can exploit such an asymmetry to
the fullest: any strategy profile can be induced as an SSE as long as it provides the leader
her maximin utility. In particular, our results indicate that there are inherent risks when
the leader uses a learning algorithm to decide on how to commit in a Stackelberg game.
An interesting question that emerges is thus how to design countermeasures to mitigate
the potential loss of a learning leader due to possible deceptive behavior of the follower.
This problem has been studied by Gan et al. (2019b) by using a mechanism design ap-
proach. They proposed that the leader could counteract by committing to a mechanism,
which prescribes a strategy to play for each possible payoff matrix the follower uses. Such
a mechanism admits an easy representation in their model because there is only a finite
number of payoff matrices the follower can use, but this is not the case for our model.
It would also be interesting to explore whether the optimal follower payoff matrix (or a
good approximation thereof) can still be computed efficiently, when additional constraints
are imposed on how much the follower can deviate from his true payoff matrix. Furthermore,
our results rely on having access to the leader’s payoff matrix uL, so it would be interesting
to see whether deception is still possible when partial access to uL is given, or the values
of uL are revealed in an online manner via querying. Finally, another interesting direction
would be to perform empirical analyses to study the average utility gain of the follower, as
well as the average loss of the leader, using both synthetic and real world data.
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